1968 and the Meaning of Democracy by Mahoney, Daniel J.
Digital Commons @ Assumption University 
Political Science Department Faculty Works Political Science Department 
2008 
1968 and the Meaning of Democracy 
Daniel J. Mahoney 
Assumption College, dmahoney@assumption.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.assumption.edu/political-science-faculty 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mahoney, Daniel J. "1968 and the Meaning of Democracy." The Intercollegiate Review 43.2 (Fall 2008): 
4-13. https://home.isi.org/1968-and-meaning-democracy. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science Department at Digital Commons @ 
Assumption University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Department Faculty Works by an 
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Assumption University. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@assumption.edu. 
4 the intercollegiate review / Fall 2008
During a recent visit to France, I had an 
opportunity to witness the ongoing French 
commemorations of the “May events” that 
shook that country to the core forty years 
ago. Parisian bookstores prominently dis-
played a massive literature on those events, 
while magazines were fi lled with nostal-
gic evocations of the three or four weeks 
that are said to have changed the world. 
Le Monde, the house journal of the estab-
lishment Left, went so far as to reproduce, 
each day, the front page of the newspaper 
on the parallel day in May 1968. Those 
old front pages perfectly captured both 
the obligatory leftism and the indulgence 
toward “Youth” that dominated that ven-
erable paper’s response to the implosion 
of the French social and political order. 
One article by Maurice Duverger was 
representative of the atmosphere of 1968: 
that famous political scientist cheerfully 
seconded the student movement’s call for 
the abolition of exams, since examina-
tions took professors away from precious 
scientifi c research and at the same time 
reinforced the alienation of the young. In 
the giddy, carnival-like atmosphere of the 
time, this passed for serious analysis.
Today, a majority of the French (or at 
least of the French intellectual class)—and 
not all of them on the Left—look back 
nostalgically to the “turning point” that 
was May 1968. Some of this is the self-in-
dulgence of a generation that is no longer 
so young. Some of it is compensation by a 
Left that now reluctantly admits that revo-
lution, even of a “mimetic” kind, is no lon-
ger a serious option for France and Europe. 
But the “commemorative” character of the 
French response to the fortieth anniver-
sary of the May events risks obscuring the 
farcical dimensions of that eruption; more 
seriously, it risks obscuring 1968’s truly 
revolutionary and ideological dimensions 
as well. Lost in the celebration of 1968 as 
the birth pangs of an unproblematic “post-
modern democracy” is a concrete feel for 
the nature of the event itself.
A Global Phenomenon
We often forget that “1968” was a truly 
global phenomenon. Americans easily re-
call Berkeley and Columbia, and Europe-
ans recall Paris and the Sorbonne. But that 
momentous year also saw unrest in Dakar, 
Mexico City, Tokyo, and elsewhere: the 
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rise of a revolutionary New Left through-
out the Western world, and in a different 
key the quasi-miraculous “Prague Spring” 
in Soviet-dominated Czechoslovakia. The 
latter gave undue hope to some on the Left 
that Leninist-Stalinist tyranny could be 
transformed into “socialism with a human 
face.”
There were both general and particu-
lar causes at work. “1968” surely had deep 
roots in cultural and social developments 
that were in the process of transforming 
the entire Western world. After the Second 
Vatican Council (1962-1965), for example, 
the Roman Catholic Church suffered 
from self-infl icted wounds. That hoary 
institution transformed itself seemingly 
overnight from an authoritative bastion 
of traditional wisdom 
to a church in appar-
ent freefall. Its “pro-
gressivist” elements did 
not hesitate “to kneel 
before the world,” cel-




velopment in society at 
large. In America, the 
moral promise of the 
civil rights movement, 
rooted in an appeal to 
American principles of liberty and equal-
ity bolstered by biblical religion, were co-
opted by the Black Power movement and 
other manifestations of identity politics. 
The Women’s Liberation movement and 
the recently manufactured birth control 
pill (it was introduced in France in 1967) 
conspired, for better or worse, to sever sex-
uality from a natural order and individual 
liberty from its larger familial and social 
contexts. In France, social institutions as 
diverse as the Church and the Boy Scouts 
scrambled to adopt less hierarchical “power 
structures” in the years immediately before 
1968. Everywhere an ideology of liberation 
challenged the old bourgeois ethos of self-
command and self-control. “1968” was in 
some important respects an explosion in a 
dramatic process already well under way 
rather than the unanticipated announce-
ment of a new world.
May 1968
Despite these major social and cultur-
al transformations, nothing in France 
seemed particularly out of the ordinary on 
the eve of May 1968.1 No one anticipated 
that ongoing disputes about the organiza-
tion of the French university system would 
give rise to momentous social and politi-
cal upheavals. Unrest at the University of 
Nanterre, fueled by the activism of anar-
chist revolutionaries led by Daniel Cohn-
Bendit, soon spread to the Sorbonne. In 
the days after May 3, that august institu-
tion was more or less commandeered by 
student radicals. Students clashed with 
police even as they—and sympathetic 
professors—“contested” the traditional 
structures of state and society. Student 
protesters combined violence with a festive 
atmosphere celebrating their emancipation 
from traditional educational obligations 
Paris, May 1968: violence at the carnival
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and social and cultural restraints. In the 
face of this rapidly deteriorating situation 
(and of public opinion’s remarkable indul-
gence toward the student “revolutionar-
ies”), the government of Prime Minister 
Pompidou began to lose nerve. 
The initial student phase of the May 
events was followed by a nation-wide gen-
eral strike (of up to ten million workers) 
that lasted two weeks and shut down the 
economic life of the country. This second, 
“economic” phase of the crisis was followed 
by a “political phase” that lasted from 
May 27 until May 30. For the fi rst time, it 
looked like the strong, self-respecting con-
stitutional order inaugurated by Charles 
de Gaulle in 1958 might collapse under the 
combined assaults of a student revolution, 
a general strike, and the machinations of 
leftist political forces. A takeover by the 
Communist Party and other “popular” 
forces became a real possibility for the fi rst 
time. It was only on May 30 that France 
began to step back from the abyss.
After initial hesitations—and a lacklus-
ter television address on May 24—Presi-
dent de Gaulle seized the initiative with a 
truly decisive radio address to the nation 
on May 30, 1968.2 He announced his de-
cision to dissolve the National Assembly 
and to call for elections. He denounced 
the “intimidation, intoxication, and tyr-
anny” exercised by various revolutionary 
groups as well as the danger posed by a 
“party which is a totalitarian enterprise.” 
He lamented the fact that as a result of this 
intimidation teachers were prevented from 
teaching, students from studying, and 
workers from working. And he reassured 
the French people that “the Republic will 
not abdicate.” Hundreds of thousands of 
citizens responded to de Gaulle’s radio ad-
dress by descending on the Champs Ély-
sées for a massive rally in support of the 
Republic. The tide had now turned. The 
general strike began to run out of steam. 
It took another couple of weeks (and three 
“nights of the barricades”) for order to 
be restored to the Sorbonne and the Left 
Bank. In the elections at the end of June, 
the Gaullists for the fi rst time won an ab-
solute majority in the National Assembly. 
Things had come full circle.
We have noted that revolutionaries of 
the Left (Trotskyites and Maoists of vari-
ous stripes) played a major role in radical-
izing the student movement. These sub-
terranean revolutionary “groupuscules” 
outmaneuvered the Communist Party and 
claimed to speak for the young as a whole. 
Some of these militants (André Glucks-
mann, Bernard-Henri Lévy, and the other 
“new philosophers” of media fame come to 
mind) later broke with revolutionary ide-
ology and became vocal defenders of “the 
rights of man.” These soixante-huitards 
(’68ers) now tend to read their own in-
tellectual and political trajectory into the 
nature of the event itself. They remain 
partisans of 1968 even in their new cen-
trist or even conservative incarnations. 
But in truth there is an element of bad 
faith and wishful thinking informing the 
“libertarian” reading of 1968. The “liber-
tarianism” of 1968 directed nearly all its 
anti-authoritarian ire at bourgeois society 
and was remarkably indulgent toward the 
totalitarianism of the Left. The “Marxist 
consensus” so abundantly on display that 
year did not at the time refl ect the slightest 
clarity about the real nature of communist 
totalitarianism. That was to come later, 
under the impact of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag 
Archipelago, a work that had a much more 
dramatic impact in France than anywhere 
else in the Western world.
Aron’s Witness
In retrospect, it is easy to forget the mas-
sive abdication of good sense by so many 
who ought to have known better during 
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the course of the May events. The great 
exception was the French political phi-
losopher, sociologist, and journalist Ray-
mond Aron. His columns in Le Figaro and 
his lively, eloquent, and insightful book La 
revolution introuvable (The Elusive Revo-
lution) were beacons of clarity and civic 
courage in the midst of the “revolutionary 
psychodrama” (as he pointedly called it at 
the time).3 Aron was the fi rst to expose the 
“imitative” character of students and intel-
lectuals play-acting at revolution, risking 
the destruction of bourgeois society and 
the liberal university with little or noth-
ing constructive to offer in their place. He 
recalled Flaubert’s and Tocqueville’s pow-
erful critiques of the revolution of 1848 
(where a similar “literary politics” guid-
ed the pseudo-Jacobins of that time) to 
highlight the French propensity to make 
revolution in the place of a serious effort 
to bring about reforms.4 A man of remark-
ably balanced judgment, Aron was angered 
by the inability and unwillingness of those 
in positions of responsibility to resist the 
delirium of the time. In The Elusive Revo-
lution he eloquently defends his refusal to 
“take too seriously” the various actors in 
the “revolutionary comedy”:
I refuse to salute our “admirable youth.” 
Too many grown men have done so. Bar-
ricades which are symbolically effective 
seem to me to be neither an intellectual 
nor a moral achievement. If young peo-
ple have some exalted memory of the 
barricades, well and good. Why should 
old people be obliged to counterfeit 
sentiments which they do not feel? If 
the young denounce the brutality of the 
C.R.S. (the French riot police) while in 
the same breath preaching the cult of 
violence themselves, the contradiction 
seems to me to be nothing more than a 
good technique of subversion. But men 
of my generation or of the generation 
after do not want to feel that they were 
caught up in what I persist in calling 
collective madness. They do not accept 
that they are out of their minds.5
Aron had long been a critic of the 
over-centralized and overcrowded French 
university system and had even left the 
Sorbonne “in disgust,” as he put it, some 
months before May ’68. And while he re-
spected General de Gaulle as an authen-
tically great man, he also freely acknowl-
edged the limits of Gaullist hauteur, the 
quasi-monarchical style that had set the 
tone for the French Fifth Republic. He 
was also critical of the civil service authori-
tarianism of the Fifth Republic’s govern-
ing class and of the quasi-neutralist bent 
of French foreign policy. 
In Aron’s view, the Fifth Republic was 
a liberal order that respected fundamen-
tal political and personal liberties. But 
its approach to governing was excessively 
aloof and oligarchic and thus insuffi -
ciently “republican” in character. A neces-
sary strengthening of executive authority 
had led to an excessive depoliticization 
of French society. Still, if Aron could not 
simply accept the Gaullist vision of France 
he personally felt “closer to the Gaullists 
than to their opponents.” He was “deeply 
wounded by” 1968’s “radical negation of 
patriotism and by the substitution of the 
name of Che Guevara for that of a resis-
tance hero [Charles de Gaulle].”6
Unfortunately, Aron’s voice was largely 
absent from the French commemoration 
of the May events (although the distin-
guished French quarterly Commentaire, 
founded by Aron in 1978, published an 
excerpt from La revolution introuvable and 
two broadly Aronian refl ections on the 
May events in its Summer 2008 issue). 
This relative absence of Aron’s perspective 
in the contemporary debate is problematic 
for several reasons. Aron’s writings on 1968 
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serve as a powerful corrective to the ongo-
ing French tendency to become “obsessed 
by their memories or the myths of their 
past” and to mistake “riots and disorder” 
in the streets of Paris “for a Promethean 
exploit.” In addition, Aron’s writings on 
1968 make abundantly clear what was at 
stake in the fi nal “revolutionary” days of 
May before de Gaulle’s May 30 radio ad-
dress awoke the good sense of France’s si-
lent majority. 
There were only two plausible political 
alternatives to the Fifth Republic. The fi rst 
was the rule of a “totalitarian enterprise,” 
the Communist Party, which had been 
driven by the power vacuum at the end of 
May to call for a “popular government” (a 
government of the Left, dominated by the 
Communist Party). The second possibil-
ity was the establishment of a Sixth French 
Republic headed by an offi cial of the non-
communist Left such as François Mitter-
rand or Pierre Mendès-France. Such a re-
public would be the product of lawlessness 
and would be “truly unworthy” of a self-
respecting people and nation. As we have 
seen, Aron was ambivalent about the es-
tablished political regime in France. Yet he 
vigorously supported the continuity of the 
legal government. The Gaullist republic 
“was based on universal suffrage” and did 
not violate “fundamental liberties.”7 All of 
the available political alternatives—gener-
alized lawlessness, communist despotism, 
or a power play by the opposition—were 
much less acceptable.
One can continue this sort of analysis. 
The distinguished French historian Alain 
Besançon has written a masterful new 
memoir on May ’68 that appeared in the 
aforementioned Summer 2008 issue of 
Commentaire.8 As Besançon observes, the 
Communist Party did not really want rev-
olution. In part it feared the abyss opened 
up by a truly revolutionary situation; in 
part the French Communist Party and its 
Soviet masters were broadly satisfi ed with 
de Gaulle’s “independent” foreign policy. 
There was an implicit “pact” between the 
Gaullists and the Communists that had 
served to maintain order in France. But at 
the time there was no guarantee that that 
pact would hold. And, in fact, after May 
27, the pact had dangerously frayed. The 
Communists, stung by the opposition of 
their own rank-and-fi le union members 
to the Grenelle accords (dramatic conces-
sions offered by the Pompidou government 
to put an end to the general strike), and by 
revolutionary agitation on the ultra-Left, 
were increasingly prepared to cross the 
Rubicon—to engage in real revolutionary 
action. De Gaulle was not being dema-
gogic in his speech to the nation on May 
30: he genuinely feared that a Commu-
nist takeover was a distinct possibility in 
France. On the eve of the May 30 address, 
such anti-communist stalwarts (and critics 
of May ’68) as Aron, Annie Kriegel, and 
Alain Besançon seriously contemplated the 
possibility of going into exile if everything 
was indeed lost. Elegiac French accounts 
of 1968 as a legitimate “democratic” pro-
test against Gaullist authoritarianism and 
the stifl ing conformities of a hierarchical 
social order therefore grossly obscure the 
political stakes of the May events. “1968” 
was much more than an “eruption of the 
social” as so many analysts suggest today. 
In May 1968 a “revolutionary psycho-
drama”—a seemingly harmless talkfest— 
brought France, and France alone in the 
Western world, perilously close to a genu-
ine revolutionary confl agration.
The Thought of ’68
Besançon has perceptively noted the yawn-
ing gap between the heady language in 
which the actors of 1968 expressed them-
selves and the “uniformity” of that event’s 
consequences. Understanding that gap is 
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crucial to deciphering the “mystery” and 
“ambiguity” of 1968. The May events did 
not have a single or uniform profi le. The 
remarkably juvenile slogans—“Demand 
the impossible,” “It is forbidden to forbid,” 
“Take your desires for realities”—in them-
selves are without any serious intellectual 
interest or content. They are, however, 
revealing popular expressions of a deep-
seated antinomianism connected to the 
thought underlying 1968. 
To the extent that the movement had a 
coherent ideological profi le it can be found 
in the conjunction of the philosophy cur-
rent in France in the 1960s—“structural-
ist,” Byzantine, obscure—with a diffuse 
“leftist” ideology that paid homage to 
Mao, Trotsky, and Castro. This ideology 
had its “hard” core in the revolutionary 
“groupuscules” mentioned above, which 
played a major role in radicalizing events 
in both the universities and the factories. 
This ideology’s “soft” core was anti-au-
thoritarian and anti-hierarchical, what 
might broadly be called “left-libertarian” 
in orientation. In both its soft and hard 
manifestations, the radicals of 1968 evoked 
a revolutionary alternative to bourgeois so-
ciety that somehow would not culminate 
in Soviet-style bureaucratic despotism (by 
now, the Soviet Union seemed hopelessly 
“petrifi ed” to them).
The partisans of 1968 were mesmerized 
by the vision of “direct democracy” in an 
industrial society and appealed to “partici-
pation” (“autogestion”) as the only legitimate 
governing principle within every educa-
tional, social, economic, and political in-
stitution.9 Authority as such was identifi ed 
with domination and repression. Of course, 
this overlooked elementary social realities 
and necessities. Aron nicely highlights the 
“scorn for facts,” for elementary social reali-
ties, that underlay the radically egalitarian 
vision of the Parisian intellectuals:
Many higher intellectuals have an in-
credible scorn for facts. The formula 
“there are no facts” is much acclaimed 
in Parisian circles. Of course, I am 
aware that in a sense this formula is 
philosophically true. There are no facts 
which have not been construed from 
documents by an historian. I am aware 
of this kind of consideration—after all, 
I began my career as a philosopher by 
making speculations of this kind. But 
when all is said and done at times I am 
tempted to...state that every society is 
subject to the constraints of fact—the 
need for production, for organization, 
for technical hierarchy, the need for 
techno-bureaucracy and so on. French 
intellectuals are so subtle that they end 
up by forgetting the obvious.10
In a famous book that has given rise 
to endless polemics, La pensée de 68,11 the 
French philosophers Luc Ferry and Alain 
Renault analyzed “the thought of ’68,” the 
anti-humanist philosophical currents that 
preceded, informed, and were given new 
life by the revolutionary spectacle of that 
year. Some of Ferry and Renault’s critics 
have vociferously denied that thinkers such 
as Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan had much 
of a “causal” role in the May events. Their 
writings were too abstract to infl uence a 
broader public and some of them (Foucault 
in particular) were initially skeptical of the 
students and their motives. But all of this 
is beside the point. Ferry and Renault did 
not claim that “anti-humanism” or sophis-
ticated Parisian nihilism caused the May 
events. They made the more limited and 
plausible claim that the French philosophy 
of the 1960s created an atmosphere that 
nourished the spirit of ’68 and informed 
the actions of many of its key players. In 
important respects, Ferry and Renault were 
merely developing an insight that Aron had 
already highlighted in The Elusive Revolu-
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tion (they cite him generously at a crucial 
moment in their book).
As Aron noted in the midst of the 
events, Parisian intellectuals (with a few 
notable exceptions) succumbed to nihilism 
of a particularly crude variety when they 
confused their “critical function” with an 
“absolute condemnation of society.” They 
practiced—even perfected—the “literary 
politics” of the revolution of 1848 that had 
been condemned by Tocqueville in his Rec-
ollections. Too many preached or tolerated 
“the cult of pure violence” with no thought 
of an alternative society except a vague vi-
sion of a radiant future without hierarchy 
or vertical structures of authority. At the 
same time, the same fi gures showed lim-
itless indulgence (and fascination) toward 
murderous tyrants in far-off lands about 
which they knew little or nothing.
Forsaking the Stalinism of old, Parisian 
intellectuals succumbed to a gauchisme 
tinged by the fashionable intellectual ni-
hilism of the day. And in the midst of the 
crisis, the “cult of action” associated with 
the existentialist-cum-Marxist Jean-Paul 
Sartre, made a (temporary) comeback on 
the streets of Paris. Aron writes:
The god of the intellectuals of the six-
ties was no longer the Sartre who had 
dominated the post-war period, but a 
mixture of Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, Al-
thusser and Lacan. All passed for struc-
turalists, although they were structural-
ists in different ways. The most refi ned 
of the intelligentsia watched Godard’s 
fi lms, read Lacan without understand-
ing him, and swore by the scientifi city of 
Althusser and acclaimed Lévi-Strauss’s 
structuralism. Oddly, some of these 
avant-garde intellectuals claimed to be 
scientifi c with respect to ethnology or 
economics, but Maoist when it came 
to action. During the May period the 
scientifi city disappeared and the cult of 
action, the cult of the cultural revolu-
tion, spread in various forms. Sartre and 
Dialectical Reason, the groupe en fusion, 
the revolutionary mob, had taken their 
revenge on the structure of society.12
The intellectuals discussed by Aron 
showed little regard for the fragility of 
civilized order. They celebrated every as-
sault on established authority as a victory 
for personal freedom and authenticity.
One of the defi ning traits of the New 
Left everywhere was its confl ation of liber-
ty with “liberation” and its willful refusal 
to distinguish authority from authoritari-
anism. Nor was this a passing phase. In the 
years after the May events, as Roger Kim-
ball and Roger Scruton among others have 
documented, “the thought of ’68” became 
the offi cial philosophy of the humanities 
in universities throughout the Western 
world. The scientism of the structuralists 
gave way to radical social constructivism 
and intemperate efforts to subvert—to 
“deconstruct”—traditional wisdom and 
established social institutions. Egalitarian 
moralism coexisted with a fanatical repu-
diation of the idea of Truth, with a dog-
matic insistence that morality and justice 
have no other supports than the linguis-
tic categories and cultural assumptions of 
a contingent social order. The academic 
partisans of “deconstruction” give no more 
thought than their forebears in France to 
the effects of such easy-going nihilism 
on the capacity of free men and women 
to live together in a spirit of responsibil-
ity and mutual respect. Without some sort 
of grounding, “equality” and “justice” be-
come will-o’-the-wisps, ideological slogans 
to express contempt for a reality that does 
not live up to the languid dreams of demi-
intellectuals.
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“Social” Consequences of 1968
If the quasi-revolutionaries of ’68 failed 
to replace the existing political order in 
France, they were far more successful on 
the “social” plane. It is a mistake to deny 
altogether the real benefi ts that accompa-
nied this upheaval. The democratization 
of mores, the weakening of heavy-hand-
ed “paternalist” authority in the family, 
Church, and political order, the growing 
demands for genuine consultation between 
employers and employees and rulers and 
the ruled: all these did serve to revitalize 
the democratic energies of modern soci-
ety. These developments, legitimate within 
limits as a corrective to the rigidities of a 
traditional social order, were, however, well 
underway before 1968. With the explosions 
of May they took on a strikingly destruc-
tive cast. As Chantal Delsol has pointed 
out, along with the (qualifi ed) benefi ts that 
fl owed from the May events came excesses 
of every kind. New ideologies were com-
mitted “to effac[ing] from the earth all the 
authority of the old societies, with the goal 
of installing their own.”13 This new authori-
tarianism was more illiberal than anything 
found in the old order since it showed limit-
less contempt for the habits, practices, and 
judgments that had long served to support 
civilized human existence.
 Alain Besançon also locates the deepest 
meaning of 1968 in a broadly Tocquevil-
lian framework. Besançon acknowledges 
that the May movement had elements of 
psychodrama. Some of its features were 
indeed “accidental and insignifi cant.” But 
its deepest meaning only became apparent 
later. If the American and French revolu-
tions installed democracy in the political 
realm, “’68 has extended the fi eld of de-
mocracy to the whole of the social order.” 
With a comment (and pathos) worthy of 
Tocqueville, Besançon notes that “the rev-
olution is not fi nished.” By this he means 
that the “democratic revolution” contin-
ues to transform and to undermine every 
authoritative institution. Everything, in-
cluding truth itself, must bow before the 
tribunal of autonomy and consent.
The most convincing interpretations 
of May ’68 bring together Aron’s political 
perspective with a broadly Tocquevillian 
appreciation for the ongoing effects of the 
modern “democratic revolution.” At the 
time of the May eruption Aron hesitated to 
endorse André Malraux’s interpretation of it 
as entailing the “end of a civilization.” This 
kind of analysis seemed unduly apocalyp-
tic to him. Ten years later, however, in his 
In Defense of Decadent Europe, Aron freely 
spoke of the May events as inaugurating a 
“crisis of civilization,” a systematic assault 
on all those authoritative institutions (e.g. 
the Church, the army, the university) that 
were necessary to sustain a free and civilized 
human order. But rather than seeing May 
’68 as the founding moment of authentic 
democracy, Aron saw it as a profound “cor-
ruption” of the democratic principle. 
This pregnant line of argument has 
been developed by Dominique Schnap-
per, the distinguished French sociologist 
and member of the French Constitution-
al Court (who is also Raymond Aron’s 
daughter). She writes suggestively about 
a “philosophy of in-distinction” that has 
become widespread in the Western demo-
cratic world.14 The democratic principle of 
human and civic equality has been radi-
calized, as Tocqueville predicted, into a 
passion for equality that perceives “every 
distinction...as discriminatory, every dif-
ference as inegalitarian, every inequality as 
inequitable.” The relations between civic 
equals which is at the heart of democratic 
political life becomes the unchallenged 
model for all human relations. Moreover, 
a laudable respect for the accomplishments 
of different cultures has given way to an 
absolute relativism that denies the very 
idea of universal moral judgments and a 
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universal human nature. Such “extreme 
equality,” as Montesquieu already called it 
in Book 8 of The Spirit of the Laws, is a cor-
ruption of democracy lurking at the heart 
of the “democratic” eruption that charac-
terized May 1968.
The Revolution Continues
The problem confronting the West to-
day is that this corruption or radicaliza-
tion of democracy is too often confused 
with democracy itself. In his magisterial 
Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy 
Pierre Manent refers to democracy’s “im-
moderate friends,” who are also its worst 
enemies. They are its enemies because 
they undermine the distinctions neces-
sary to preserve democracy’s moral health 
and political vigor. In France today, a new 
intellectual industry has arisen dedicated 
to safeguarding the ideological legacy 
of 1968. The partisans of “humanitarian 
democracy” vehemently denounce critics 
of 1968 and its legacy as “reactionaries,” 
even as they deny there is any discernable 
“pensée de 68.” A recent book, for example, 
expresses venomous disdain for “la pensée 
anti-68” even as it tries to save Aron (al-
though only half-heartedly) for the camp 
of “progress”! The important thing, its 
author tells us, is to recognize 1968 as a 
“precious moment,” the founding moment 
of a democracy that broke down authori-
tarian mores, liberated social energies, and 
defended citizenship in its new meaning as 
“participation.”15 The old historicist appeal 
to the camps of “progress” and “reaction” 
lives on. But now everything stands or 
falls not with one’s judgment of the Soviet 
Union, the homeland of “socialism,” but 
with one’s commitment to the memory—
and the “values”—of 1968. Somehow, I do 
not see decisive progress.
The censorious response of the ideo-
logical guardians of 1968 to the slightest 
criticism of their moral authority refl ects 
one of the most salient features of that 
event: it undermined the moral and in-
tellectual continuity of Western civiliza-
tion. The partisans of 1968 date the birth 
of a European democracy worthy of the 
name—humanitarian, open, postnation-
al, and postreligious—to the social up-
heavals of the late 1960s. The “old West,” 
all the old worlds (as Charles Péguy might 
put it), whether Christian, republican, or 
classically liberal, are relegated to a “cul-
pable past.” That past is suspect precisely 
because it recognized the importance of 
other values than “the rights of man” and 
exhibited a now unacceptable toleration of 
wars, colonialism, social paternalism, and 
religious authoritarianism. At most, this 
older liberal and Christian West is given 
its limited due as the “prehistory” of a self-
confi dent, humanitarian, global democra-
cy. More frequently, it is looked at warily 
as a model to be studiously avoided. 
The contemporary West which 1968 
has bequeathed to us above all defi nes 
itself by its adherence to “democratic val-
ues.” For a long time, however, the old and 
new dispensations, political democracy 
and older moral traditions and affi rma-
tions, coexisted without too much (practi-
cal) diffi culty. In response to the inhuman 
totalitarianisms of the Left and the Right 
that were the scourge of the twentieth cen-
tury, churchmen discovered the virtues 
of liberal constitutionalism and political 
liberals rediscovered the moral law at the 
heart of Western civilization. Faced with 
the totalitarian negation of constitutional-
ism, the moral law, and the very ideas of 
unchanging truth and common humanity, 
liberals and conservatives rallied in sup-
port of a West that was still able to draw 
upon the best of both the modern and the 
premodern traditions. 1968 shattered this 
anti-totalitarian consensus and gave birth 
to “postmodern democracy.”
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The relentless assault on the principle 
of authority proceeds apace. This process 
is so regularized that we have ceased to 
notice or appreciate its truly revolutionary 
character. Our political orders are bereft 
of statesmanship, the family is a shell of its 
former self, and infl uential currents within 
the churches no longer know how to dif-
ferentiate between the sublime demands 
of Christian charity and demagogic ap-
peals to democratic humanitarianism. Eu-
ropeans have increasingly severed a le-
gitimate and salutary concern for human 
rights from its political context, which is 
self-government within a territorial state 
indebted to the broad traditions of civi-
lization. They desire what Pierre Manent 
calls “pure democracy.” They increasingly 
defer to an “idea of democracy” which 
has no tolerance for the crucial histori-
cal, cultural, and political prerequisites of 
democratic self-government. 1968 played a 
central role, as both cause and effect, in 
this reduction of a capacious tradition of 
liberty to an idea of democracy committed 
to a single principle: the maximization of 
individual autonomy and consent. One of 
the enduring lessons of May 1968, there-
fore, is surely that the “idea” of democ-
racy is never suffi cient unto itself. As pure 
abstraction or ideology, democracy risks 
becoming a deadly enemy of self-govern-
ment and of human liberty and dignity, 
properly understood.
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